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Abstract:  Examining the relationship between jealous behaviour and the amygdala may be 
quite informative about the function of the amygdala, but the amygdala may be less helpful in 
informing us about jealous behaviour. Claims about the potential practical relevance of the 
results also require that the magnitude of the effects inform the relevant discussion. The dogs 
used in the study probably share some very important personality characteristics; this too 
limits the practical implications of Cook et al.’s findings for dogs in general. It is nevertheless a 
testament to the skill of the experimenters, and the amazing bond between dogs and humans, 
that such research could be conducted at all.  
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It is a remarkable feat to have trained 13 dogs to tolerate an fMRI scanner, let alone get them 
to cooperate in an experiment in such a context. One cannot help but be deeply impressed by 
the experimental virtuosity of the researchers (Cook et al., 2018). However, I am certainly not 
the first to be uneasy about the real utility of much neuroscience research: There is something 
of a backlash against many of the claims of neuroscience (Satel & Lilienfeld, 2013), a backlash 
so well established that there is a backlash against the backlash (Marcus, 2013). At a broad 
philosophical level, my concern with the target article is that it is implicit in the title that we 
can take jealousy in dogs more seriously because of evidence from neuroscience. However, it 
is an uncomfortable truth for some scientists studying emotion that the primary data for our 
knowledge about emotions are subjective experience and human judgement. The plural of 
anecdote in this case is data. Our knowledge of the localisation of affect is ultimately derived 
from human experience and judgement. We think a particular area of the brain may be 
associated with a particular emotion because we have induced a particular emotion and then 
observed what the brain gets up to. We know what emotions are because we are emotional 
beings. We began investigating jealousy in dogs because our experience with dogs suggested 
that dogs were jealous. We did not start to investigate jealousy in dogs because of what was 
going on in their amygdala. Studying brain/behaviour relationships provides a rich source of 
information concerning brain function, but much less so concerning behaviour.  
 There are several more technical issues that I would like to mention. I am not at all sure 
that amygdala function can provide really useful information. The amygdala is implicated in 
just about everything from emotion, to fundamental cognitive processes such as long-term 
memory, working memory and visual attention (Schaefer & Gray, 2007). The statistical analysis 
is also problematic, as interpreting the magnitude of effects from a mixed-effects model is by 
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no means straightforward. In the discussion, the authors make no mention of the magnitude 
of the effects, but simply state that there was a positive correlation between aggressive 
temperament and amygdala activation. The magnitude of any such relationship is crucial to 
any claims that the information from the study could inform behavioural interventions.  
 My final comment is that regardless of the C-BARQ scores, given what the dogs were 
required to do, I cannot think that these dogs were anything but highly social, unaggressive 
and co-operative. These may be special dogs. In any study of individual differences, it is crucial 
to have sampled the range of the trait of interest. The findings of a study of individual 
differences using 13 very carefully trained and selected participants must be treated with 
great caution. 
 My overwhelming feeling having written this commentary is social guilt (which I believe 
is thought to be localised to the anterior middle cingulate cortex) because being a critic is easy, 





Cook, P., Prichard, A., Spivak, M., & Berns, G. S. (2018). Jealousy in dogs? Evidence from 
brain imaging. Animal Sentience 22(1) 
Marcus, G. (May 27, 2018). The problem with the neuroscience backlash. The New Yorker.    
Satel, S., & Lilienfeld, S. O. (2013). Brainwashed, the seductive appeal of mindless 
neuroscience. New York: Basic Books.  
Schaefer, A., & Gray, J. R. (2007). A role for the human amygdala in higher cognition. Reviews 
in the Neurosciences, 18, 355-382.
 
ISC 2018 Summer School 
in Cognitive Sciences 
June 26 - July 6, 2018 
Montreal (Canada) 
The Other Minds 
Problem: Animal 
Sentience and Cognition 
 
 
Overview. Since Descartes, philosophers know there is no way to know for sure what — or whether — others feel (not 
even if they tell you). Science, however, is not about certainty but about probability and evidence. The 7.5 billion individual 
members of the human species can tell us what they are feeling. But there are 9 million other species on the planet (20 
quintillion individuals), from elephants to jellyfish, with which humans share biological and cognitive ancestry, but not one 
other species can speak: Which of them can feel — and what do they feel? Their human spokespersons — the comparative 
psychologists, ethologists, evolutionists, and cognitive neurobiologists who are the world’s leading experts in “mind-
reading" other species — will provide a sweeping panorama of what it feels like to be an elephant, ape, whale, cow, pig, 
dog, chicken, bat, fish, lizard, lobster, snail: This growing body of facts about nonhuman sentience has profound 
implications not only for our understanding of human cognition, but for our treatment of other sentient species. 
Gregory Berns: Decoding the Dog's Mind with Awake 
Neuroimaging 
Gordon Burghardt: Probing the Umwelt of Reptiles 
Jon Sakata: Audience Effects on Communication Signals 
PANEL 1: Reptiles, Birds and Mammals 
WORKSHOP 1: Kristin Andrews: The "Other" Problems: Mind, 
Behavior, and Agency 
Sarah Brosnan: How Do Primates Feel About Their Social 
Partners?  
Alexander Ophir: The Cognitive Ecology of Monogamy 
Michael Hendricks: Integrating Action and Perception in a Small 
Nervous System 
PANEL 2: Primates, Voles and Worms 
WORKSHOP 2: Jonathan Birch: Animal Sentience and the 
Precautionary Principle 
Malcolm MacIver: How Sentience Changed After Fish Invaded 
Land 385 Million Years Ago 
Sarah Woolley: Neural Mechanisms of Preference in Female 
Songbird 
Simon Reader: Animal Social Learning: Implications for 
Understanding Others 
PANEL 3: Sea to Land to Air 
WORKSHOP 3: Steven M. Wise: Nonhuman Personhood 
Tomoko Ohyama: Action Selection in a Small Brain (Drosophila 
Maggot) 
Mike Ryan: "Crazy Love": Nonlinearity and Irrationality in Mate 
Choice 
Louis Lefebvre: Animal Innovation: From Ecology to 
Neurotransmitters 
PANEL 4: Maggots, Frogs and Birds: Flexibility Evolving 
SPECIAL EVENT: Mario Cyr: Polar Bears 
Colin Chapman: Why Do We Want to Think People Are 
Different?  
Vladimir Pradosudov: Chickadee Spatial Cognition 
Jonathan Balcombe: The Sentient World of Fishes 
PANEL 5: Similarities and Differences 
WORKSHOP 5 (part 1): Gary Comstock: A Cow's Concept of 
Her Future 
WORKSHOP 5 (part 2): Jean-Jacques Kona-Boun: Physical 
and Mental Risks to Cattle and Horses in Rodeos 
Joshua Plotnik: Thoughtful Trunks: Application of Elephant 
Cognition for Elephant Conservation 
Lori Marino: Who Are Dolphins? 
Larry Young: The Neurobiology of Social Bonding, Empathy and 
Social Loss in Monogamous Voles 
Panel 6: Mammals All, Great and Small 
WORKSHOP 6: Lori Marino: The Inconvenient Truth About 
Thinking Chickens 
Andrew Adamatzky: Slime Mould: Cognition Through 
Computation 
Frantisek Baluska & Stefano Mancuso: What a Plant Knows 
and Perceives 
Arthur Reber: A Novel Theory of the Origin of Mind: 
Conversations With a Caterpillar and a Bacterium 
PANEL 7: Microbes, Molds and Plants 
WORKSHOP 7: Suzanne Held & Michael Mendl: Pig Cognition 
and Why It Matters 
James Simmons: What Is It Like To Be A Bat? 
Debbie Kelly: Spatial Cognition in Food-Storing 
Steve Phelps: Social Cognition Across Species 
PANEL 8: Social Space 
WORKSHOP 8: To be announced 
Lars Chittka: The Mind of the Bee 
Reuven Dukas: Insect Emotions: Mechanisms and Evolutionary 
Biology 
Adam Shriver: Do Human Lesion Studies Tell Us the Cortex is 
Required for Pain Experiences? 
PANEL 9: The Invertebrate Mind 
WORKSHOP 9:  Delcianna Winders: Nonhuman Animals in 
Sport and Entertainment    
Carel ten Cate: Avian Capacity for Categorization and 
Abstraction 
Jennifer Mather: Do Squid Have a Sense of Self? 
Steve Chang: Neurobiology of Monkeys Thinking About Other 
Monkeys 
PANEL 10: Others in Mind 
WORKSHOP 10: The Legal Status of Sentient Nonhuman 
Species  
 
 
 
